Signs Point to Pakistan Link - ADAM ENTOUS, JULIAN E. BARNES and MATTHEW ROSENBERG

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303553679080310.html

I think that Pakistan's dilemma is that support for religious radicals is both an unfortunately necessary way to retain legitimacy in the eyes of many of its citizens, and also (and probably because of) that same support is ingrained in much of their military and intelligence apparatus. That is not to say that the military or intelligence services are arrayed against us and stand in allegiance with the radicals. Far from it. There are many within those services that would support the US against their own government. The problem is myriad, but suffice it to say that there are pockets of allegiance to the government, the West, money, religion and the radicals all competing against each other for the soul of Pakistan.
Add to that the fact that for many years the Pakistanis have used the radicals to wage their proxy war against India, and many in the Pakistani military may consider India enough of a threat to consider it worth their time to agitate the US here and there in exchange for continued cannon fodder to use against the Indians. Further, the support of the radicals and the rural and border regions they originate from is critical to any government that hopes to keep the lid on the pot while ruling the country. You just can't maintain legitimacy and ignore them. Well, you can but it requires one of the many military juntas that have plagued Pakistan in the past to take power.
So we're left with a nuclear armed power that must give tacit if not express support to radicals. It finds that its rivalry with India probably supersedes any benefit it gets from its relationship with the US, or that they are at least equal, and must each be attended to with great care. The radicals provide personnel and intelligence in the proxy war Pakistan maintains against India for the disputed province of Kashmir, which cannot be abandoned or it would quite probably plunge Pakistan into further chaos as the radicals would enter open revolt against the Pakistani government. So the many in the ISI play both sides, perhaps out of loyalty but more likely out of consideration of other interests, allowing some activity against the US and the West but probably drawing the line at other points.
This is the opaque Central Asian pattern that has been at work for ten thousand years and while there is no reason for us to expect that the attacks on September 11th, 2001 would change that calculus, there is also no reason for us to simply accept it. That is why there was a blackout in terms of telling the Pakistanis about our raid, because while we can trust some, we're not even sure who they are.